ABSTRACT Internet of Things (IoT) is a network of all devices that can be accessed through the Internet. These devices can be remotely accessed and controlled using existing network infrastructure, thus allowing a direct integration of computing systems with the physical world. This also reduces human involvement along with improving accuracy and efficiency, resulting in economic benefit. The devices in IoT facilitate the day-to-day life of people. However, the IoT has an enormous threat to security and privacy due to its heterogeneous and dynamic nature. Authentication is one of the most challenging security requirements in the IoT environment, where a user (external party) can directly access information from the devices, provided the mutual authentication between user and devices happens. In this paper, we present a new signature-based authenticated key establishment scheme for the IoT environment. The proposed scheme is tested for security with the help of the widely used Burrows-Abadi-Needham logic, informal security analysis, and also the formal security verification using the broadly accepted automated validation of Internet security protocols and applications tool. The proposed scheme is also implemented using the widely accepted NS2 simulator, and the simulation results demonstrate the practicability of the scheme. Finally, the proposed scheme provides more functionality features, and its computational and communication costs are also comparable with other existing approaches.
I. INTRODUCTION
IoT encompasses a system of physical objects that are interconnected to exchange and collect data over the internet. These objects are equipped with the required processing and communication abilities and possess a locatable Internet Protocol address (IP address). The objective here is to integrate computer-based systems and the physical world for economic benefit and to improve accuracy and efficiency while reducing human involvement. Cyber-physical systems such as smart grids and intelligent transportation can be considered as subsets of IoT [1] . The connectivity provided should be beyond machine-to-machine communication covering various protocols and applications interconnecting systems, devices and services. Multiple technologies like wireless communication, embedded systems, machine learning, etc. are the building blocks of this vision. Applications of IoT are diverse including infrastructure management in highrisk conditions, disaster management through environmental monitoring and providing remote health-care services, to list a few. IoT, while broadening access to information, has an enormous threat to security and privacy due to its heterogeneous and dynamic nature. Cyber attacks could change from virtual to physical with the increase in number of wearable devices. An estimated 50 billion objects will be a part of IoT by 2020 [2] . IoT being a relatively new concept, the security challenges involved have not been addressed appropriately at the design level for these objects. Employing effective security practices, especially authentication and key management schemes to protect anonymity and privacy, is required.
A. SYSTEM MODELS
In this paper, we have followed two models which are discussed below. 
1) IoT AUTHENTICATION MODEL
In the given IoT authentication model shown in Fig. 1 , we consider four different scenarios, i.e., Home, Transport, Community and National. All these scenarios have smart devices, such as sensors and actuators. These devices facilitate the day to day life of people. In the given scenarios, all smart devices are connected to the Internet through the gateway nodes (GWN s). Different types of users (for example, smart home user and doctor) can access the data of relevant IoT devices through the GWN . Mutual authentication between a user and a device through the GWN provides access to device data to the user [2] .
2) THREAT MODEL
We follow the widely-accepted Dolev-Yao threat (DY) model [3] . Under the DY model, communication between two entities is performed over a public channel. An adversary can then have an opportunity to eavesdrop, modify or delete the content of the messages being transmitted. It is further assumed that the adversary can physically capture one or more sensing devices in IoT, and can extract all the sensitive information stored in the captured devices using the power analysis attacks [4] , [5] .
B. OUR CONTRIBUTION
The contributions of this paper are: -An authentication model for IoT is presented and the security challenges involved and its requirements are discussed. -A secure signature-based authentication and key agreement scheme has been proposed to address these issues. -A formal security analysis using BAN logic and an informal security analysis have been presented to prove that the scheme is secure. -Simulation using the AVISPA tool for the formal verification of the scheme's security has also been provided. -Using NS2 simulator, the scheme's impact on network performance parameters has been measured for practical demonstration of the scheme. -Finally, it has been shown that the scheme is also efficient in terms of communication and computation costs.
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we discuss the necessary mathematical preliminaries which are needed to describe and analyze the proposed scheme. Section III discusses some security challenges and requirements in IoT.
In Section IV, we discuss some existing related work done to address these issues. Sections V and VI present the proposed scheme and its rigorous security analysis, respectively. A comparative analysis of communication and computation costs and functionality features among some related existing schemes for IoT is presented in VII. Section VIII provides an insight into the impact of the scheme on network performance parameters using the NS2 simulator. Finally, some conclusions are drawn in IX.
II. MATHEMATICAL PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly discuss the properties of an elliptic curve over a finite field. Suppose a ∈ Z p and b ∈ Z p be two constants, where Z p = {0, 1, . . . , p − 1} and p > 3 is a prime. A non-singular elliptic curve
where a, b ∈ Z p such that 4a 3 + 27b 2 = 0 (mod p), with a point at infinity or zero point O.
Let P = (x P , y P ) ∈ E p (a, b) and Q = (x Q , y Q ) ∈ E p (a, b) be two points. Then x Q = x P and y Q = −y P when P + Q = O. Q = −P ∈ E p (a, b) is called the inverse of P ∈ E p (a, b). Also, P + O = O + P = P, for all P ∈ E p (a, b). Hasse's theorem states that the number of points on curve E p (a, b), denoted as #E, satisfies the following inequality [6] :
In other words, there are about p points on an elliptic curve E p (a, b). In addition, E p (a, b) forms a commutative or an abelian group under addition modulo p operation with O as VOLUME 5, 2017
the additive identity and −P ∈ E p (a, b) as the additive inverse of the point P ∈ E p (a, b).
A. ELLIPTIC CURVE POINT ADDITION
Suppose G is the base point on E p (a, b) with order n, that is,
be two points on the elliptic curve. Then, R = (x R , y R ) = P + Q is calculated as follows [6] :
B. ELLIPTIC CURVE POINT SCALAR MULTIPLICATION
The elliptic curve multiplication is done as repeated additions. For example, 5P = P + P + P + P + P where P ∈ E p (a, b).
III. SECURITY CHALLENGES AND REQUIREMENTS IN IoT APPLICATIONS
As accessibility and global connectivity are the key requirements of any IoT application, it increases the available avenues of threats and attacks. The heterogeneous nature of IoT further raises complexity in the deployment of security mechanisms. The wireless nature of most involved entities and their limited capacity are also problematic. Possible transient and random failures are vulnerabilities that attackers could exploit. The various possible attacks on IoT applications are as follows:
• Denial-of-Service: Apart from conventional denial-ofservice (DoS) attacks like exhausting resources and bandwidth, IoT can be susceptible to attacks on communication infrastructure like channel jamming. Adversaries who are privileged insiders can gain control of the relevant infrastructure to cause more chaos in the network.
• Controlling: Active attackers can gain partial or full control of IoT entities and the extent of damage that can be caused is based on the following:
− Services being provided by the entity. − Relevance of the data being managed by that entity.
• Eavesdropping: This is a passive attack through which information can be gathered from channel communication. A malicious insider attacker can also gain more advantage by capturing infrastructure or entities.
• Physical damage: The easy accessibility of IoT entities and applications can be exploited by attackers to cause physical harm hindering services by attacking an entity or the hardware of the module creating it virtually. Attackers lacking technical knowledge and wanting to cause considerable damage can utilize this.
• Node capture: Easy accessibility can also be a vulnerability for information extraction through capturing entities and trying to extract stored data. This is a major threat against data processing and storage entities. The countermeasures to recover from such attacks once they are detected and diagnosed should be lightweight due to the limited capacity of the involved entities. The solutions must be real-time in nature and if possible, a part of self-healing infrastructure. Any programming information required to deploy the solution should be communicated securely to the entities. The following are some requirements for IoT to counter security breaches:
• Reliability: The aim is to guarantee information availability while efficiently managing data storage. Providing redundancy among communication channels through multiple paths is one way to ensure availability.
• Responsibility: Otherwise known as access control, this ensures legitimate access to services by defining privacy constraints. The rules for each entity and possible liabilities must be clearly defined to avoid damages.
• Privacy: Owing to the ubiquitous nature of IoT, providing privacy is very important. There are the following three areas where privacy has to be ensured:
− Data sharing and management: This can be achieved by enumerating data aggregated at the sensors. Also, privacy-preservation techniques can be used.
− Data collection: Some cryptographic approaches mentioned in [7] and [8] can be used.
− Data security: This can be ensured through password protection.
• Trust: IoT being dynamic and distributed, ensuring trust among interacting entities is important. In a heterogeneous network like IoT where devices and not just humans can be involved in trust management, resource constraints should also be considered while developing techniques.
• Safety: System components can be prone to sudden failures and safety is required to reduce damage possibilities.
• Identification and authentication: Privacy and secure access can be ensured primarily through this. As global access is a necessity in IoT, entities could have one permanent and several temporary identities.
IV. RELATED WORK
Authentication schemes for IoT networks should take into account their dynamic, heterogeneous and distributed nature. These schemes can be broadly classified into categories as follows:
• Asymmetric key based approach: Although public key cryptography (for example, RSA algorithm) is suitable for multicast and broadcast, the high communication, computation and storage overheads make it unsuitable for resource constrained applications and networks. Developments in wireless technology have necessitated the implementation of schemes in this category [9] - [12] . Of these, certificate based schemes have unusually heavy overheads. For IoT applications, Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) based authentication handshake has been proposed in [7] . To counter the high energy consumption due to RSA based encryption and public-key infrastructure certificates in [7] , the authors in [13] proposed an elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) based approach. The schemes based on the Merkle hash tree [8] have the advantage of balancing communication and storage overheads, but they are not scalable. Protocols based on user identity [8] - [14] typically use bilinear pairing adding to energy costs. ECC-based RFID authentication schemes are susceptible to tracking attacks on the RFID tag [15] . However, recent research demonstrates that ECC based public key cryptosystem is suitable for resource-constrained devices (for example, sensor nodes in a sensor network) [16] - [19] as only 160-bit ECC offers the same level of security as compared to that of 1024-bit RSA. Thus, ECC is very efficient as compared to RSA due to its smaller key size.
• Symmetric key based approach: µTESLA and related schemes [8] , [20] - [23] are some of the earliest proposed protocols in this category. Despite reducing energy consumption by using hash functions, they are susceptible to denial-of-service attacks because of delayed authentication, and also do not check for data integrity. Other symmetric key schemes based on key ring [24] and knowledge of deployment [24] are not scalable, and therefore, these are unsuitable for dynamic environments like IoT.
• Signature based approach: Schemes similar to [25] and [26] pro vide fast generation and verification of signatures. Also, immediate authentication is guaranteed, and no synchronization is needed. However, long signature and key lengths as used in [27] - [29] make these suitable only for applications that send messages infrequently.
V. PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we present a new signature-based authenticated key establishment scheme using the authentication model for IoT applications provided in Fig. 1 . As shown in this figure, different users communicate with each other and with various smart devices through gateways to ensure secure communication. The proposed scheme can be applied in all kinds of the IoT applications. For example, a doctor can remotely monitor a patient's vitals through the readings recorded by sensing devices in wireless body area networks. A home user can detect any intrusion by monitoring smart meter readings. In the proposed scheme, a legal user can access the information from a sensing device in the IoT applications provided that both mutually authenticate each other. After their mutual authentication, a secret session key will be established between them for their future secure communications. The notations used in detailing the proposed scheme have been listed in Table 1 . To protect the proposed scheme from strong replay attack, we use both random numbers as well as current timestamps. For this reason, we assume that all the entities involved in IoT environment are synchronized with their clocks. The proposed scheme consists of the following eight phases, namely, 1) system setup, 2) sensing device registration, 3) user registration, 4) login, 5) authentication and key agreement, 6) password & biometric update, 7) smart card revocation and 8) dynamic sensing device addition. The detailed descriptions of these phases are discussed in the following subsections.
A. SYSTEM SETUP PHASE
The system setup is done by the gateway node GWN as follows.
• Step S1. GWN chooses a non-singular elliptic curve E p over a prime finite field Z p , p being a large prime. GWN then selects a base point P of order n over E p such that n.P = O, where O is called the point at infinity or zero point. GWN also chooses its private key d GWN and computes the corresponding public key Q GWN = d GWN .P.
• Step S2. GWN then chooses a collision-resistant oneway cryptographic hash function h(·).
• Step S3. For biometric authentication, GWN uses the following two fuzzy extractor functions:
It is a probabilistic generation function that takes as input the user personal biometrics Bio i , and returns σ i ∈ {0, 1} l that is the biometric key of length l bits and τ i that is a public reproduction parameter.
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− Rep: It is a deterministic function to be used during authentication. The input is the user biometrics, say Bio and τ i , provided the hamming distance between Bio and the original previously entered biometrics Bio i is less than t, where t is an error tolerance threshold value. The output is the original biometric key σ i , that is,
• Step S4. Finally, the system parameters
, t} are made public, whereas d GWN is kept secret by GWN .
B. SENSING DEVICE REGISTRATION PHASE
All the sensing devices in IoT are registered offline by the GWN as follows.
• Step SD1. For each device SD j , the GWN chooses a unique identity ID j and a unique private key d j , and calculates the corresponding public key
• Step SD2. The GWN pre-loads {ID j , d j , RID j } in the memory of SD j . Furthermore, the GWN stores {ID j , RID j , Q j } in its database, and then makes Q j as public.
C. USER REGISTRATION PHASE
A user U i registers with the GWN by executing the following steps:
• Step R1. U i chooses a unique ID i , a unique private key d i and calculates the corresponding public key
to GWN via a secure channel.
• Step R2. GWN computes R i = h(RID i d GWN ), stores it on smart card SC i and sends it to U i via a secure channel.
• Step R3. U i selects a password PW i and imprints the biometrics template Bio i at the sensor of a specific terminal. SC i then computes the following:
The user registration phase has been summarized in Fig. 2 .
D. LOGIN PHASE
U i executes the following steps to login to the GWN :
• Step L1. After inserting SC i , U i enters his/her identity ID i and password PW i , and also imprints biometrics Bio i at the sensor of a specific terminal.
• Step L2. SC i then computes • Step L3. If the above condition is verified successfully, U i chooses a random secret number a ∈ Z * p , generates the current timestamp T i and creates a login message with signature as follows:
where ID j is the identity of the sensing device SD j that U i wants to communicate with. U i finally sends
as login message via a public channel.
E. AUTHENTICATION AND KEY AGREEMENT PHASE
In this phase, the GWN validates U i and helps in establishing a session key between an accessed sensing device SD j and a legal user U i with the help of the following steps:
• Step A1. After receiving the login message from U i at the time T i , the GWN first checks the validity of timestamp by the condition
If it is, then the GWN verifies U i 's signature as follows: 
as explained above to verify U i 's signature.
• Step A2. After successful signature verification, GWN chooses a random secret number c ∈ Z * p , generates its current timestamp T GWN and computes the following message with signature:
GWN then sends authentication request message
• Step A3. If SD j receives the message at time T GWN , it verifies the timeliness of
Note that GWN as shown above to verify GWN 's signature. After successful signature verification, SD j chooses a random number b ∈ Z * p , generates its current timestamp T j , and computes the session key with signature as follows:
SD j sends authentication reply message with
• Step A4. U i receives SD j 's authentication message at time T j and verifies if T j −T j ≤ T . If the validity of timestamp passes, U i verifies SD j 's signature and computes the session key as follows:
above, and establishes secure communication with SD j using the session key sk ij . The summary of login and authentication phases is provided in Fig. 3 . 
,
). , respectively. This phase has been summarized in Fig. 4 . 
G. SMART CARD REVOCATION PHASE
If the smart card SC i of a legitimate user U i is lost, the following steps can be executed for requesting a new one: • Step RV3. U i then uses the current PW i and Bio i to compute the following:
• Step RV4. SC new i is personalized with the values
This phase has been summarized in Fig. 5 . 
H. DYNAMIC SENSING DEVICE ADDITION PHASE
Dynamic sensing device addition is necessary as some devices may be physically compromised by an attacker and we need to deploy some new devices in the network. Suppose a new sensing device SD new j is to be deployed in the network. The GWN then performs the following steps offline: After the deployment of SD new j , the GWN informs the users in the network so that they can access SD new j using the login and authentication & key agreement phases described in Sections V-D and V-E, respectively.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we first prove that the proposed scheme provides secure mutual authentication between a user U i and a sensing device SD j with the help of the widely-accepted BAN logic. Furthermore, we show that the proposed scheme is secure against various known attacks informally. In addition, the formal security verification using the broadly-accepted AVISPA tool ensures that the scheme is also secure against replay and man-in-the-middle attacks.
A. MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION USING BAN LOGIC
To prove that a user U i and a sensing device SD j mutually authenticate each other through fresh and trustworthy information, the BAN logic is being used. This is achieved by verifying the message's origin, the origin's freshness and trustworthiness. The following notations are used in the BAN logic:
• A |≡ X : A believes the statement X .
• A X : A sees X , i.e. A has received a message containing X .
• A |∼ X : A once said X i.e A |≡ X when A sent it.
• A | ⇒ X : A has authority or jurisdiction over X .
• #(X ): X is a fresh message.
• A K ←→ B: K is shared secret key between A and B.
• X K : X is encrypted with key K .
• < X > Y : formula X is combined with formula Y .
• (X ) K : X is hashed with key K .
• (X , Y ): X or Y is one part of formula (X , Y ). The logical postulates in the BAN logic are described using the below mentioned rules:
Rule 1 (Message Meaning Rule (MMR)): P believes Q once said X if P sees a message X encrypted with K and P believes K is a shared secret between P and Q.
Rule 2 (Nonce Verification Rule (NVR))
: P believes Q believes X if P believes Q once said X and P believes X is fresh.
P |≡ #{X }P |≡ Q |∼ X P |≡ Q |≡ X .
Rule 3 (Jurisdiction Rule (JR))
: P believes X if P believes that Q believes X and P believes Q has jurisdiction over X .
Rule 4 (Freshness Rule (FR)):
The entire formula is believed to be fresh if a part of the formula is believed to be fresh, .
Rule 5 (Belief Rule (BR)): P believes Q believes part of the formula if P believes Q believes a formula,
P believes combined formula (X , Y ) if P believes X and P also believes Y .
Theorem 1:
The proposed scheme provides the secure mutual authentication between a user U i and a sensing device SD j .
Proof: The login and authentication phases involve exchanging of messages whose generic form can be expressed as follows:
Idealized form: The ideal forms of the above messages can be expressed as follows:
. Goal: The goals to be proven are the following:
←→ SD j , using the assumptions mentioned below:
The mutual authentication between U i and SD j is as follows: S1. From message 1, we get,
S2
. Using S1, A5 and MMR, we obtain,
S3. Using S2, A3, FR and NVR, it follows that
S4. Using A6, S3, JR and BR, we get SD j |≡ (R i T i ). S5. Using S4 and BR, we get,
(Goal G2) S6. From message 2, we get,
S7. Using S6, A7 and MMR, we get,
S8. Using S7, A1, FR, NVR and BR, we get,
←→ SD j . S9. Using S8, A9 and JR, we get,
(Goal G1) The goals G1 and G2 clearly show that U i and SD j mutually authenticate each other with help from the GWN .
B. DISCUSSION ON OTHER ATTACKS
An informal analysis in the following sections shows that the proposed scheme is secure against various well-known attacks, and it also provides the required functionality features.
1) PRIVILEGED-INSIDER ATTACK
A privileged user at the GWN , who may be an adversary A, can obtain RID i , which is the user U i 's registration information during the user registration phase. Suppose the smart card SC i of U i is lost or stolen by A after the registration process is completed. Even by retrieving all stored information from SC i using the power analysis attacks [4] , [5] , such as 
. Thus, the proposed scheme is secure against this attack.
2) USER IMPERSONATION ATTACK
Assume an intruder I tries to create a valid login request message by impersonating U i after obtaining U i 's login request message {DID i , DID j , A i , r i , s i , T i }. For this, I can select a random number a ∈ Z * p and attempt to compute A i = a .P,
Here, I needs to know ID j of the sensing device SD j that U i is attempting to communicate with, RID i of U i and private key d GWN of GWN to compute R * i = h(RID i d GWN ) to be able to successfully compute V i . Hence, recreating login request by eavesdropping is impossible and it makes our scheme secure against this attack.
3) OFFLINE PASSWORD GUESSING ATTACK
Suppose an adversary A knows all information in smart card
} using the power analysis attacks [4] , [5] . A cannot derive U i 's password PW i because of hash function h(·)'s one-way property which protects ID i , d i and σ i from A. Therefore, the proposed scheme is secure against such an attack.
4) STOLEN SMART CARD ATTACK
A lost/stolen smart card SC i of U i reveals all the stored
} to an adversary A. However, U i 's secret credentials are not revealed as h(·) and U i 's private key d i protect the values ID i , σ i and PW i . Thus, the proposed scheme is secure against this attack.
5) DENIAL-OF-SERVICE ATTACK
Even if a legal user U i enters incorrect ID i and/or PW i during login phase, it is locally detected through the verification RPW i = RPW i ( Step L2 in Section V-D). The login request to the GWN is sent only after successful verification. Therefore, the proposed scheme is safe from this attack.
As the current time stamps of all involved entities GWN , U i and SD j are used in all communicated messages with a sufficiently small acceptable delay interval, T , an adversary A cannot replay login or authentication messages obtained by eavesdropping. As a result, the replay attack is prevented in the proposed scheme.
7) MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACK
Suppose an adversary A intercepts the login request message 
In a similar way, A can not also create other messages during the authentication and key establishment phase. Therefore, the proposed scheme is secure against man-in-the-middle attack.
8) RESILIENCE AGAINST SENSING DEVICE ATTACK
Similar to wireless sensor network user authentication [30] , [31] , we also measure the resilience against sensing device capture attack of a user authentication scheme in IoT environment. Suppose c sensing devices are physically captured by an adversary A. We then estimate the fraction of total secure communications that are compromised by a capture of c sensing devices not including the communication in which the compromised sensing devices are directly involved. For example, one can find out the probability that A can decrypt the secure communication between a user and a non-compromised sensing device when c sensing devices are already compromised. If this probability is denoted by P e (c) and P e (c) = 0, a user authentication scheme is called unconditionally secure against sensing device capture attack.
Let A capture a sensing device SD j . A can then extract the information {ID j , d j , RID j } from its memory using power analysis attacks [4] , [5] . Note that all these ID j , d j and RID j are distinct for all the sensing devices in IoT, and these are generated by the GWN . Hence, by capturing SD j , A can only compromise the session key between that a user and SD j . However, all other session keys between that user and other non-compromised sensing devices are not compromised by A. As a result, compromise of a sensing device does not lead to compromise of the secure communications among a user and other sensing devices, and therefore, the proposed scheme is unconditionally secure against sensing device capture attack. GWN , s GWN } and Msg 3 = {B SD j , s SD j , T j } during the login & authentication phases. Due to random number a and current timestamp T i , each of DID i , DID j , A i , T i , r i and s i are dynamic and ''unique'' in Msg 1 for each session. Similarly, due to random numbers and current timestamps used, Msg 2 and Msg 3 are also dynamic and ''unique'' for each session. Furthermore, none of these messages directly includes the identities ID i and ID j in the plaintext transmission over insecure channels. Hence, the proposed scheme preserves both anonymity and untraceability properties.
9) ANONYMITY AND UNTRACEABILITY

Assume that an adversary
A intercepts Msg 1 = {DID i , DID j , A i , T i , r i , s i }, Msg 2 = {V GWN , T GWN , T i , A i , C
C. FORMAL SECURITY VERIFICATION USING AVISPA TOOL
In this section, we simulate the proposed scheme using broadly-accepted AVISPA tool [32] . We provide the implementation details of our scheme in high-level protocol specification language (HLPSL) [33] and then the simulation results to show our scheme is secure against replay and manin-the-middle attacks.
1) HLPSL IMPLEMENTATION
The HLPSL implementation for registration, login and authentication/key agreement phases involves three basic roles: user (shown in Fig. 6 ) for a user U i , gwn (shown in Fig. 7) for the gateway node GWN and sensingdevice (shown in Fig. 8 ) for a sensing device SD j . The implementation also requires defining the necessary roles for the session, and goal and environment (shown in Fig. 9 .
After receiving the start signal to begin the communication, U i alters the value of variable State to 1 from 0. During registration, U i sends a registration request message RID i via a secure channel to GWN . GWN changes its state to 2 from 0 and replies via a secure channel with a smart card with {R i } stored on it. U i then alters its state to 2 from 1. The login phase is then initiated by U i by sending a login request message DID i , DID j , A i , T i , r i , s i to GWN via an open channel. Upon receiving the message, GWN alters its state to 4 from 2. GWN then forwards an authentication request message with V GWN , T GWN , T i , A i , C GWN , s GWN to SD j over a public channel to initiate the authentication and key establishment phase. Once it receives the message, SD j changes its state to 3 from 0 and responds by sending an authentication reply message with B SD j , s SD j , T j to U i over a public channel.
In the role for SD j , the witness declaration witness(SDj, Ui, sdj_ui_b, B') means that b ∈ Z * p has been chosen freshly for U i by SD j . The request declaration request(SDj, Ui, sdj_ui_b, B') in role for U i indicates that U i has accepted the value b generated for it by SD j . The secret declaration secret({Dgwn}, sec2, {GWN}) in the role for GWN indicates that GWN keeps its private key d GWN as secret. The protocol id sec2 characterizes this declaration. Similarly, all other witness, request and secret declarations have been defined. In our VOLUME 5, 2017 FIGURE 6. Role specification in HLPSL for the user U i .
implementation, three secrecy goals and six authentication goals are required.
The intruder (i) has also been shown as one of the participants through a concrete session in the protocol execution.
2) ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
We have chosen the broadly-used On-the-fly ModelChecker (OFMC) and Constraint Logic based Attack Searcher (CL-AtSe) backends for the execution test to find whether there are any attacks on the proposed scheme [32] . To check for the possibility of a replay attack, these backends verify if the specified protocol can be executed by the legitimate agents by searching for a passive intruder. The back-ends provide the intruder (i) with information about a few normal sessions between the legitimate agents. To check the Dolev-Yao model, the back-ends also verify if there is any possibility of a man-in-the-middle attack by the intruder.
All public parameters are known to the intruder. We have simulated the proposed scheme using SPAN, the Security Protocol ANimator for AVISPA [34] , for both OFMC and CL-AtSe backends. The simulation results of the analysis using these backends shown in Fig. 10 ensure that the proposed scheme is safe against replay and man-in-the-middle attacks. The output in Fig. 10 has the following sections:
SUMMARY: This either indicates that the scheme has been found to be safe or unsafe or that the analysis has been inconclusive. If an attack is found, the trace is printed in the standard Alice-bob format with a few statistics and comments. 
VII. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
This section presents a performance comparison of the proposed scheme with other related authentication schemes [36] - [38] previously proposed for IoT applications. In Porambage et al.'s scheme [37] , there are two protocols: protocol 1 allows only the legitimate members of the multicast group as eligible to continue the rest of the process of key derivation, and protocol 2 allows to establish a shared secret key among the multicast group.
The approximate time required for every operation and the terms used in calculating computational overhead are provided in Table 2 . We use Table 2 for computational cost computation required for the login and authentication phases. Table 3 shows the comparison of computational costs among the proposed scheme and other schemes [36] - [38] . From this table, it is observed that the computational cost of the proposed scheme is comparable to that for other schemes. The proposed scheme performs better than Porambage et al.'s scheme [37] . Though the proposed scheme requires more computational cost as compared to the schemes [36] , [38] , the proposed scheme offers more functionality features and better security as compared to the other schemes as shown in Table 5 .
For comparing communication overheads among the proposed scheme and other related schemes, the following have been assumed: -Sequence number, random nonce or time stamp is of length 32 bits. -Hash function used is secure hash standard (SHA-1) [39] . Hence, hash digest length is 160 bits. -Identity ID is of length 160 bits.
-As the security of 160-bit ECC cryptosystem is equivalent to that for 1024-bit RSA cryptosystem [40] , an elliptic curve point P = ((P) x , (P) y ) requires (160 + 160) = 320 bits. Table 4 show the communication overheads for all protocols during the login and authentication phases. The communication cost required by the proposed scheme is less than that for the schemes [37] , [38] . However, our scheme needs more communication overhead as compared to that for Porambage et al.'s scheme [36] . It is justified as the proposed scheme offers more functionality features and better security as compared to the other schemes as shown in Table 5 .
Finally, in Table 5 , the availability of the desired functionality features in the existing schemes has been compared with the proposed scheme. The proposed scheme provides all the desired functionality features, while other schemes lack in key areas like providing user anonymity and security against impersonation and offline password guessing attacks. Also, a rigorous security analysis and formal security verification using the widely-accepted BAN logic and AVISPA tool, respectively, are not provided in other schemes.
VIII. PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVE: NS2 SIMULATION STUDY
In this section, we simulate our scheme using the widelyaccepted network simulation tool, NS2 2.35 simulator [41] [42] on Ubuntu 14.04 LTS platform to measure the network performance parameters, such as throughput (in bps) and end-to-end delay (in seconds) to show the impact of the scheme.
A. SIMULATION PARAMETERS
The details of the parameters used in NS2 simulation are provided in Table 6 . The network simulation time is taken as 1800 seconds (30 minutes). Both static and dynamic (mobile) types of users are considered in simulations. The speeds of the mobile users are considered as 2, 10 and 15 mps, respectively. Apart from these, all other standard parameters are taken for NS2 simulations.
B. SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT
Three different network scenarios are used in the simulation. For all the scenarios, we have taken one GWN and 50 SD j s.
• Scenario 1. This scenario has three users (U i s): one is static and other two are moving with the speeds of 2 mps and 15 mps, respectively.
• Scenario 2. This scenario has five users (U i s): two are static and other three are moving with the speeds of 2 mps, 15 mps and 15 mps, respectively.
• Scenario 3. This scenario has eight users (U i s): four are static and other four are moving with the speeds of 2 mps, 2 mps, 10 mps and 15 mps, respectively. Moreover, we assume that the hash output (if we use SHA-1 hash algorithm) and the identity have bit lengths 160 bits and 160 bits, respectively. In each scenario, messages communicated between different network entities are as follows:
, which are of sizes 992 bits, 1024 bits and 512 bits, respectively.
C. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
We have evaluated network performance parameters such as throughput (in bps) and end-to-end delay (in seconds) to measure the impact of the scheme.
1) IMPACT ON END-TO-END DELAY
End-to-end delay (EED) is computed as the average time taken by the data packets (messages) to arrive at the destination from the source. EED can be formulated as n pkt i=1 (T rec i − T send i )/n pkt , where T rec i and T send i are the receiving and sending time of a packet i, respectively, and n pkt the total number of packets. The EEDs of the proposed scheme for different scenarios are given in Fig. 11 . The EEDs are 0.28683, 0.34588 and 0.36937 seconds for the network scenarios 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Further, note that the value of EED increases with the increasing number of users. This is because the increment in the number of users causes more messages to be exchanged, which further incurs congestion, and thus, EED increases in scenarios 2 and 3. 
2) IMPACT ON THROUGHPUT
Throughput is measured as the number of bits transmitted per unit time. Fig. 12 depicts the network throughput (in bps) of our scheme under different network scenarios. The throughput can be calculated as
, where T d is the total time (in seconds), |pkt| the size of a packet, and n r the total number of received packets. Note that we have considered the simulation time as 1800s, which is the total time. Throughput values are 286.84, 489.51 and 733.49 bps for the scenarios 1, 2 and 3, receptively. The throughput increases in case of increment in number of users as the number of messages exchanged also increases.
IX. CONCLUSION
We have first discussed an authentication model for future IoT applications, and then the security challenges and requirements. We have presented a new signature-based user authenticated key agreement scheme to address the security challenges and requirements in IoT. The mutual authentication between a user and an accessed sensing device is proved using the broadly-accepted BAN logic. We have also shown the security of the proposed scheme informally and the formal security verification using the widely-accepted AVISPA tool. A rigorous security analysis reveals that the proposed scheme can be protected against various known attacks by an adversary. Various network parameters are measured through a rigorous simulation using the widely-used NS2 simulator. The proposed scheme is also efficient in computation and communication, and these are comparable with other existing approaches. High security, efficient computational and communication costs along with additional functionality features show that the proposed scheme is suitable for practical applications in IoT environment as compared to other related schemes.
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